Secure by Default? Here's How I Spot the Gaps in the Field
Introduction
Picture this: I’m crouched in a dusty backroom of a small-town public library, tracing a tangle of Ethernet cables. It’s 2025, but here the network gear looks straight out of 2010. A blinking Linksys router (circa early ’10s) sits on a shelf, still set with its factory default SSID and password. “Secure by default” clearly didn’t apply here.
As a network security consultant, I’ve learned that secure by default isn’t the default out in the field—especially not in rural or under-resourced environments. You’d be amazed how often I walk into a site and find devices wide open on default settings. It’s not that folks want to be insecure; often they just don’t know what lurks in those default configurations, or they assume the vendor locked things down out of the box (often, it didn’t).
Field Anecdote: Small-Town Library Lockdown
I was called to this public library because the Wi-Fi kept dropping whenever more than a few patrons were online, and the staff worried something was “hacking” them. The library had gotten a donated Starlink satellite internet hookup (a godsend for their location), feeding into that old Linksys router for Wi-Fi. When I logged into the router’s admin panel (admin/admin, of course), I immediately saw the issue: nothing had been updated or secured in years. The firmware was ancient, the firewall was off, and UPnP was still enabled (so any device could poke a hole through the NAT). Even the Wi-Fi network for patrons was an open network—no password at all—because the staff “didn’t want to make it hard for guests.”
Those default settings were basically screaming “come on in.” No surprise, it was probably already getting probed by bots out on the internet. I’ve seen this story before: default credentials and open doors attract trouble. In fact, recent research in 2025 found over 40,000 internet-connected cameras streaming openly with no passwords at all. If thousands of people unknowingly expose their security cams, imagine how many small offices and homes are running routers and IoT gadgets on factory defaults.
And that Starlink modem? Its web interface was accessible from outside because remote management was on by default. A quick check online showed it would be easy for anyone to find.
To fix things, I rolled up my sleeves. First, I swapped in a pfSense box I had brought along – a compact PC Engines APU board running pfSense, which I often use as a firewall/router in the field. I put the Starlink unit into bypass mode and let pfSense take over routing and firewall duties. Out of the box, pfSense is far more secure: it doesn’t even allow admin access from the WAN side by default (unlike that old Linksys which happily did). I configured VLANs on pfSense: one for library staff devices, one for public Wi-Fi users, and one for IoT devices (like the security cameras they had monitoring the entrance). This segmentation meant that even if one area got compromised, it wouldn’t immediately spill over into others.
I also set up a Raspberry Pi running Pi-hole (a DNS sinkhole for ads and malicious domains) on the network. This immediately cut down on random ad traffic and blocked known malicious domains that a patron’s infected device might try reaching. The Pi-hole acted as a mini shield – not a replacement for a firewall, but a nice extra layer of filtering on a $35 board.
By the end of that afternoon, we had the library’s network locked down tighter than ever. The public Wi-Fi got a WPA2 passphrase (printed neatly on a sign at the desk – inconvenience minimal, security gain maximal). The staff Wi-Fi got its own SSID and a strong key. The router admin login? Changed and handed only to the librarian-in-charge with instructions to guard it. We disabled UPnP, turned off remote management on the Starlink, and set up pfSense to allow VPN or SSH from outside only if needed. Speaking of SSH, I generated key pairs for pfSense and the Pi, and disabled password logins entirely – no more brute-force guessing to worry about.
Problem Breakdown: Why Insecure Defaults Persist in 2025
Why do I still find setups like that library in 2025? You’d think by now “secure by default” would be the norm. The reality is a mix of human nature, economics, and the long tail of legacy tech. Here are some reasons insecure defaults are still common:
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Legacy Compatibility: New devices often ship with security features turned off to play nice with older systems. Manufacturers fear breaking things for customers with legacy gear. As a result, devices that could be secure out-of-the-box might launch in a lax mode. As one cybersecurity alert in 2025 noted, backward compatibility often means security features aren’t enabled by default so that old components can still communicate. In other words, the vendor leaves the “secure mode” switch off, assuming the installer will turn it on (hint: many don’t).
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Convenience Over Security: Both vendors and users opt for ease. A device that works immediately after plugging in (no complex setup, no passwords to enter) makes for happy customers at first. The library staff didn’t set a Wi-Fi password because it was easier not to hassle patrons. That convenience trade-off is everywhere. Many consumer IoT gadgets still come with default logins like “admin/admin” because it’s easy during setup. And guess what? People rarely change them. Trend Micro noted that many users never change default device passwords, basically handing attackers the keys if they know where to look.
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Lack of Awareness: Non-IT folks running a farm co-op or a rural clinic often aren’t aware of the risks. They might not realize that the fancy new IP camera they bought can be viewed by anyone on the internet if they leave defaults in place. I’ve met small business owners who assume “if it was dangerous, the device wouldn’t allow it.” If only. In truth, security often takes a backseat to usability; the box might say “secure” but the fine print (or ignored manual) tells a different story.
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Resource Constraints: In rural deployments especially, budgets and IT staff are slim to none. People make do with old hardware or consumer gear not meant for enterprise-level security. Patching firmware or monitoring logs is low priority when just getting a stable connection is hard enough. Thus, devices remain unpatched and wide open on default settings for years. Attackers love these soft targets that fly under the radar.
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Ever-Expanding Attack Surface: Even when one hole gets closed, new devices keep coming online. That Starlink dish dramatically improved connectivity, but introduced a new piece of gear with its own default config to worry about. Multiply that by an explosion of “smart” devices (cams, sensors, thermostats) in small offices and homes. Each gadget is a potential entry if not configured securely. At scale, this is a global problem — it’s truly an Internet-wide plague.
Technical Analysis: From Audit to Action
When I walk into a site like this library, I follow a straightforward process: find what’s default, then kill it (figuratively speaking). Here’s how I spot and fix common gaps on the spot:
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Scan for Default Credentials & Open Services: I start by accessing routers, switches, or access points. Usually the owner has never changed the default admin login. If creds are default, I know the rest of the config is likely untouched too. I immediately change those to strong passwords or, where possible, set up key-based auth. In one farm, I found an OpenWrt router still using its default SSH password – I fixed that and added an SSH key so the farmer wouldn’t have to remember a long new passphrase.
I also check for open services. Is Telnet running when it shouldn’t be? Is a management interface reachable from outside? I’ve found things like IP cameras or sensor gateways with open HTTP admin pages on “admin/admin.” Part of my audit is scanning common ports (22, 23, 80, 443, 8080, etc.) to uncover anything listening that shouldn’t be public.
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Update Firmware & Patches: Next, I note firmware versions of critical devices. Many haven’t been updated since install. Outdated firmware means known vulnerabilities are lurking. If time permits, I update firmware on the spot (after backing up configs). If not, I at least document it and strongly urge the client to update. Some old devices no longer get updates (end-of-life), which then become candidates for replacement. (That’s how that library ended up with pfSense – their old router was too far gone to secure via updates.)
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Network Segmentation: A flat network (everything on one LAN) is an insecure network. In small setups I introduce VLANs or separate Wi-Fi networks to carve things up. I segment critical systems (like payment terminals or record PCs) onto their own VLAN, isolated from guest or office networks. That way an infected device in one segment can’t directly reach sensitive systems in another. VLANs are your friend – even a cheap smart switch or a VLAN-capable router (like a TP-Link Omada unit) can do the job. The key is to reduce the blast radius: if one device gets compromised, it shouldn’t open the floodgates to everything else.
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Principle of Least Privilege (for Networks): This means turning off what isn’t needed. In that clinic example, they had a Wi-Fi printer that everyone used. I put it on its own VLAN with only printing ports allowed – it didn’t need internet access at all. Similarly, I disable services like UPnP, WPS, or remote admin unless there’s a darn good reason to keep them. Each disabled default service is one less avenue for an attacker.
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Defense in Depth with Simple Tools: I add layers. The Raspberry Pi running Pi-hole is one example – it blocks known bad domains and ads network-wide. I’ve also set up basic intrusion detection (Snort/Suricata on a pfSense) for an extra set of eyes. Even a simple alert on suspicious traffic is better than flying blind. I always enable logging and send those logs somewhere they won’t be overlooked. In one case, I had an OpenWrt router send logs to a Pi-based syslog server. Doing so, we caught repeated login attempts from a Russian IP hitting an old FTP service and shut it down before it became a bigger problem.
Takeaways: Lessons from the Field
Working hands-on in these environments has taught me a few universal truths about default security:
- Never Assume It’s “Secure Enough”: If you haven’t checked something yourself, it’s not secure. That device you think is locked down? Double-check the settings, accounts, and firewall rules. Assumption is the enemy of security.
- The Small Things Bite Hard: A single default password on a “minor” device (like a printer or sensor) can undermine an entire network. Attackers go for low-hanging fruit. One weak link is all it takes.
- Security Is Layered, Not One-and-Done: You can’t just set a strong Wi-Fi password and call it a day. Each layer (device config, network design, user practices) needs attention. Overlapping layers mean if one fails, others still stand.
- Education Is Part of the Fix: Spending an extra 30 minutes to teach the librarian why a password matters, or showing the farmer how to update his router, is as critical as the technical fixes. Otherwise, in a year, we’ll be back to insecure defaults through neglect.
- Be Skeptical of “Secure by Default” Claims: It’s a great goal, and some products do better, but I’ve seen plenty of “secure” devices ship with glaring default gaps. Trust but verify; always harden as if nothing was done at the factory.
Checklist: Hardening a Small Network’s Defaults
Whenever I audit a small office or rural network, I run through a tactical checklist to catch and close the usual default security gaps:
- Change Default Credentials: On every device (router, switch, NAS, camera, etc.), change the factory logins. Use strong, unique passwords or set up SSH keys where possible. Document the new creds securely for the owner.
- Update Firmware/OS: Bring routers, access points, and critical devices to the latest firmware. Apply OS updates on PCs/servers. Patching often closes known holes that default settings left open.
- Disable Unused Services: Turn off Telnet, FTP, UPnP, WPS, RDP, or any service/protocol not needed. Fewer services = fewer doors for attackers to try.
- Enable Encryption & Strong Auth: Use WPA2/WPA3 for Wi-Fi (no open networks). Enable HTTPS on device interfaces (even if it’s just a self-signed cert). Require SSH keys for remote shell access. Disable legacy protocols (SMBv1, older TLS versions, etc.).
- Segment the Network: Use VLANs or separate subnets for guests, IoT devices, and sensitive machines. Add firewall rules between them (e.g. IoT gadgets shouldn’t initiate connections to your work PC).
- Implement Basic Monitoring: Enable logging on devices and actually review those logs occasionally. Free tools like Pi-hole or built-in router logs can alert on suspicious activity.
- Rotate Important Passwords: Schedule periodic changes for critical passwords. Regular rotation limits the risk if a credential was compromised without anyone knowing. Use a password manager or even a secure notebook – just avoid reusing weak passwords.
- Backup Configs: After making changes, back up router/switch configs and keep them safe. If a device fails, you won’t have to start from insecure factory defaults in a panic.
- Share the “Why”: Give the owner or staff a quick cheat sheet on these changes. If they understand the “why,” they’re less likely to undo them for the sake of convenience.
Conclusion
“Secure by default” sounds like a promise, but in the trenches I treat it more like a challenge. In my line of work, assuming nothing is secure until proven otherwise has served me well. The gaps are always there if you look: an overlooked default password, an unchecked remote access setting, an unpatched device quietly beckoning trouble.
The good news is that a bit of elbow grease and the right tools can turn those defaults into defenses. Whether it’s a pfSense firewall giving a tiny library enterprise-grade protection, or a Raspberry Pi with Pi-hole snipping out malicious domains on a farm network, there are accessible ways to raise the security bar.
Ultimately, being secure by default comes down to mindset as much as tech. It’s the habit of scrutinizing everything, questioning convenience, and taking nothing for granted. Out here in the field, that mindset turns defaults into defenses. If I have my way, every dusty router in every forgotten corner will be locked down tight – making farmers, librarians, and shopkeepers all a bit safer because someone took the time to flip those default settings to secure.
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